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Business ‘Power of Presence:’ Foreign Capital, Industry Practices and Politics 
of Sustainable Development in Zambian Agriculture 
S. Manda, A. Tallontire and A. Dougill 
Abstract  
Sustainable Development Goals have brought optimism around ‘agriculture for development’ but 
also questioned agribusiness in sustainable development. This paper assesses how an 
agribusiness’ power exploits domains to exert control over industry governance. Using interviews 
and group discussions from three smallholder outgrower schemes under Illovo Sugar Plc, the paper 
demonstrates that corporations can deploy the ‘power of presence’ to influence national policy 
development, and sustainability in regional and local practices. Investment and trade policies 
currently foster agribusinesses but overlook environmental assessments that expose social and 
ecological contradictions such as on competing water uses. State-donor relations enable 
smallholder integration in sugarcane as poverty reduction whilst agribusinesses are limiting their 
participation through controls on resources and production systems. By analysing power 
expressions, we show how possibilities of sustainable agriculture and rural development are 
undermined by agribusiness practices. We suggest that current policy efforts around ‘agriculture 
for development’ in Zambia are about entrenching power and interests of an agribusiness, 
neglecting industry expansion and sustainability. The paper highlights the limits and importance 
of domestic institutions in framing large-scale agricultural investments as well as mediating 
corporate practices that will be required to provide a greater focus on national planning processes 
for sustainable agriculture and rural development. 
 
Key Words: agribusiness power, Sugarcane, Sustainable development, Zambia, power of presence, 
foreign capital 
1. Introduction 
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have brought optimism around the 
role of agribusinesses in development, enhancing the prominence of agriculture across many of the 
seventeen SDGs (Spann 2017). However, existing literature on large-scale agricultural investments 
(LaSAIs) has tended to overlook the different capacities of agribusinesses to adapt and shape 
national regulatory environments. For instance, whilst neoliberal policy developments over the past 
decades have been a source of power for actors, agribusinesses linked to outgrower schemes have 
somewhat been distanced from problematic ramifications of LaSAIs (Elgert 2016; Bloomfield 
2012). Global governance institutions such as the World Trade Organisation explicitly emphasise 
agribusiness expansion, market access and increased global exports in developing countries such 
as those in sub-Saharan Africa (Spann 2017; Weber 2014). Despite widespread acceptance of he 
deepening role of corporations in agriculture, the sort of power and influence exerted by 
agribusinesses in national settings and their implications on sustainability remains poorly 
understood. Attempts to address sustainability concerns i  LaSAIs have failed to examine and 
question how agribusinesses with outgrower schemes exert their power to influence industry 
governance, social nd ecological relations (Spann 2017; Amanor 2012). Understanding claims to 
sustainability as enshrined in SDGs thus requires that we understand how policy developments in 
poor countries enable agribusiness power to shape governance dynamics.  
A key concern in LaSAIs has been the concentration of land into larger land-holdings, 
driving powerful industrial actors which invokes land-grabbing narratives. Land-grabbing is the 
‘capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources through a variety 
of mechanisms and forms, carried out through extra-economic coercion that involves large-scale 
capital, which often shifts resource use orientation into extraction, whether for international or 
domestic purposes’ (Borras and Franco 2013, p.1725). For smallholders, powerful agribusinesses 
can be exclusionary rather than inclusive and may not guarantee the more successful use of 
agriculture for development (Akram-Lodhi 2013). Negative publicity surrounding agribusinesses 
in the era of ‘land-grabbing’ has meant that policy makers recognise the need to understand who 
holds power to shape investment outcomes within their jurisdiction (Amanor 2012). Agribusiness 
power and influence that shape micro-level agriculture and development dynamics remains a key 
concern in critical agrarian literature (Rutten et al. 2017; Hall et al. 2015; Gingembre 2015). A 
wide-range of literature on LaSAIs focus on domestic institutions a  policy makers, facilitators and 
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coordinators of foreign investments (Grajales 2015; Amanor 2012; Borras et al. 2011). Some 
scholars have applied power dimensions in bargaining processes (Rutten t al. 2017); in showing 
power inequalities that underpin land acquisitions (Fairbairn 2013); with others focusing on 
domestic entities and relationships in land governance (Burnod et al. 2013). A focus on 
agribusiness practices remain thin in critical agrarian literature.  
 This paper explores how an agribusiness deploys power and influence to shape national 
policy developments, industry governance, local development and sustainability in the case of the 
sugar sub-sector in Zambia. The takeover of Zambia Sugar Plc (ZaSPlc) by Illovo Sugar Plc in the 
early 2000s, alongside the neoliberal policy ascriptions of the 1990s significantly modernized the 
sugar industry, reshaping the narrative of foreign capital in rural development. In Zambia, the 
dominant agribusiness that previously benefited from state financial and human resources has been 
able to shape neoliberal reforms in its favour and carve off competition i the domestic market 
(Richardson 2010). The paper considers how national, regional and local level domains around the 
sugar industry enables agribusinesses to exert control and influence industry governance. At a local 
level, it focuses on how an agribusiness shapes land and labour relations and what this means for 
wider development and sustainability. The specific objectives are: 1) to explore local and regional 
impacts of sugarcane expansion and how an agribusiness shapes and influence sustainability; 2) to 
examine national and industry policies shaping the sugar industry and how these processes have 
been framed to deepen an agribusiness influence and implications for development and 
sustainability; and 3) to explore key actors involved and their influence in the sugar industry. 
2. Agribusiness ‘Power of Presence’ 
This study uses the concept ‘ ower of presence’ to refer to how an agribusiness uses it  existence 
at jurisdictional scale to influence policy developments and industry practices at national, regional 
and local levels (Cash et al. 2006). Power is the ability of one actor to prevail over others in 
achieving desired goals (Lukes 2005). Influence is the process of affecting the thoughts, behaviour 
and feelings of another, but the actual capacity to influence depends on power (Lefebvre 1991). 
Agribusinesses organise in national contexts, and deploy their existence, power, knowledge and 
influence to shape governance and regulation at different levels. That agribusinesses caninfluence 
policies or align their efforts to a national agenda t one level, and shape regional and local 
governance dynamics at another level within the jurisdictional scale reflects their presence.  
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The way in which ‘power of presence’ is applied is non-linear as there can be changes in 
political and economic processes and environments. For instance, local and regional expressions 
of power are interrelated, and links to the national context. National policy actors relate differently 
to agribusiness production, sector-specific configurations including agenda setting. Regional actors 
include district administrators implementing development plans. Local actors include smallholders 
as growers and their communities. It is important to recognise that actors at different levels have 
widely different interests, perspectives and resources that means that understanding the context is
vital (see Cornwall 2002). Luke’s framework isolates three forms of power. First s instrumental 
power – overt, measurable, and observable expressions of direct influence (for instance through 
force, financial, social resources). Second is structural power – referring to the wider 
socioeconomic and political context within which political agendas are shaped and decision-
making and actions are embedded. Third is iscursive power, which points o how actors shape 
socio norms, values, and identities, and how these favour dominant interests (Lukes 2005). Gaventa 
(2006) adds an insightful angle to these forms of power, relevant to studies on environment and 
development. That is, ‘Luke’s three forms of power must also be understood in relation to how 
spaces for engagement are created, and the levels of power (from local to global), in which they 
occur’ (p.25). Power analyses thus invokes narratives of scale – as ‘spatial, temporal quantitative 
or analytical dimensions used to measure and study any phenomenon – and levels – as units of 
analysis that are located at different positions on a scale’ (Cash et al. 2006, p.8).  
In this paper, we map research domains by jurisdictional and institutional scales to
demonstrate how agribusiness power and influence takes place at diff rent levels, which relates to
the guiding laws, regulations and operating rules around the sugar industry (Cash et al. 2006). 
Domains are illustrative, selected to show different kinds of power, observed or perceived; the 
former inclined towards local-level dynamics (land, labour) while the latter towards national-level 
policy practices. Domains are closed when firms make decisions without broader consultation and 
involvement; invited when agribusinesses invite actors t  participate; and claimed/created 
(organic) when the less powerful actors make sufficient pressure and claims on the powerful 
(Cornwall 2002; Gaventa 2006).  
The Zambia sugar industry witnessed unprecedented growth and expansion particularly 
with the entry of Illovo, which took over and operates ZaSPlc since 2001. In the sub-sector, 
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competition for industry leadership and hegemony is visible, which, with supportive laws and 
regulations, creates barriers to entry as well as spaces for manoeuvre for ZaSPlc (Kalinda and 
Chisanga 2013). Regional and local level domains show an agribusiness can exercise power over 
others for instance through shaping actions and thought processes of less powerful actors. Power 
over reflect agribusiness practices in regional development linkages and practices (embeddedness 
and participation in regional/local development plans); land tenure relations; and labour regimes 
(dynamics on employment) in outgrower schemes. Agribusinesses can also influence socio-
political and economic agendas (hidden power), shaping meaning and what is acceptable about 
production or marketing (invisible power) (Gaventa 2006). 
National level domains reveal agribusinesses can exercise power within when they shape 
their sense of self-identity, confidence and awareness for actions. For instance, narratives round 
Vitamin A Fortification of sugar (Vit.AF), and how the public health policy has been justified, 
shaped and implemented enables agribusinesses to operate from a privileged angle, shaping 
industry dynamics. For instance, donor-state-agribusiness collaborations around sugarcane 
outgrower schemes under the donor-driven Zambia National Sugar Adaptation Strategy (ZNSS) 
have been regional and around ZaSPlc, enabling corporate influence. Within this perspective, state 
agencies restrict the power of municipalities (water and land) through hierarchical mechanisms, or 
where responsibilities of national state agencies conflict with lower ones (for instance overlapping 
authorities) but maintaining agribusiness interests (Termeer et al. 2010). Closely linked are 
industry practices that shape sector strategies and policies including processes that underpin sugar 
price formation and transmission. Agribusinesses can hold power to expressed in actor’s capacity 
to act. For instance, through financial power and investment scope, agribusinesses sign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPA) which protect their industry position and strengthen 
their influence.   
These processes are by no means absolute but highlight interdependences between business 
and governments, which permits the former to enter crucial domains/spaces and influence the latter 
(Richardson 2010). Within such interdependences, agribusinesses may deploy diverse strategies to 
a countermovement at different levels including co-optation or closing spaces completely. Some 
of these relate to financial and economic power to seen in production expansion and industry 
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capabilities. In this paper, we explore local, regional and national domains to tease out perceptions 
of an agribusiness power and what this mean for sustainable development. 
3. Research Design and Methods   
3.1 Setting  
Dubbed Zambia’s ‘Sugarbelt,’ Mazabuka district in southern province is one of Zambia’s hotspots 
for commercial agriculture (Lay et al. 2018) (Figure 1). With a population of about 261,907 and at 
74% poverty rate, Mazabuka is one of the poorest in Zambia (CSO 2010). Both customary and 
private landholding exist, the former being dominant among smallholders. Vast land and water 
resources as well optimal agronomical conditions make Mazabuka a target for agribusiness 
expansion particularly sugarcane (Manda et al. 2018). 
    
  
Figure 1: Map showing the Sugarbelt district of Mazabuka  
The post-2000 period has seen ZaSPlc enhance smallholder integration and expand land area under 
production through diverse production systems including outgrower schemes. In highlighting 
industry dominance, ZaSPlc produced 3,246,000; 3,154,000; and 3,417,172 tons of sugar 
compared to 260,000; 345,000; 305,000 tons for Kafue Sugar, the closest competitor (2013-2015) 
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(Drawn from industry stakeholder interviews). We focus in our study on three schemes: Kaleya, 
Magobbo and Manyonyo (Figure 2), to highlight how firms with outgrower schemes exert their 
power and influence across various levels. 
 Kaleya scheme started in 1984 and operates via an integrated limited company (KASCOL), 
which provides extension services to smallholders such as input supply, managerial, marketing 
including commercial operations. Farmers directly cultivate sugarcane on average 7.5ha household 
plots whilst using an additional half-hectare for subsistence crop production. Cultivation of 
sugarcane utilises household labour and capabilities that ensure: land preparation, irrigation, 
weeding, fertiliser application and so-forth. All land belongs to KASCOL, and as tenants farmers 
run a 14-year renewable lease.  
Magobbo is a block-farm which amalgamates land from 80 households. Starting in 2008, 
Magobbo scheme leases the block-farm to ZaSPlc’s subsidiary Nanga Farms Plc. Its formation 
responds to the European Commission’s 60% financing agreement, with the balance being covered 
by ZaSPlc as farmer loans. Nanga Farms runs a centralised system that allows parties to conduct 
joint activities such as bulk supply of production materials. Production and commercial aspects are 
all controlled by Nanga Farms and farmers receive a share of profits made on their plots. Magobbo 
thus provides opportunities to explore a novel coordination scheme where farmers do not 
necessarily cultivate their land directly.  
Finally, Manyonyo scheme started in 2009 and is considered a state project but co-funded 
by the Finnish government and the African Development Bank. Manyonyo is a clustered scheme 
with multiple crops under consideration such as maize, bananas and other horticultural crops, but 
only sugarcane is currently grown. Whereas farmers formed a farmer-based company (Manyonyo 
Irrigation Company), all production and management operations fall directly under ZaSPlc. 
Challenges in funding saw ZaSPlc fund operational costs whilst shifting the scheme focus to 
sugarcane. As with Magobbo, smallholders receive a share of the profits.   
 
Figure 2: Structure of outgrower schemes on the Zambia’s Sugarbelt
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3.2 Data Collection 
Data collection was shaped by a framework which utilises perception as evidence, measuring views 
and perceptions of an agribusiness power and influence in various domains. Perceptions provide 
insights into agribusiness legitimacy and acceptability of their actions, how and why they act the
way they do and implications for their actions. Perceptions also highlight how stakeholders 
experience an agribusiness with outgrower schemes (Bennett 2016).  
Data is drawn from interviews at different levels, in-depth household interviews, focus 
group discussions including detailed observations and field notes collected between June 2015 and 
February 2016 (Details of interviews are listed in section B of the Supporting Information; i  the 
text, references to interviews are identified by the interview code and date, e.g. D12:16.01.16). Key 
policies and strategies shaping the industry were identified on which e onducted a preliminary 
content analysis and then went further to elicit stakeholder views on the role and framing of an 
agribusiness.  
 Different interviews were conducted with state, donor and NGO actors, private sugar 
consultants, sugarcane firms and companies, and academics and research think-tanks to under tand 
the organisation of the sub-sector as well as perception of ZaSPlc (n=37). Interviews were 
complemented by a review of policy documents to identify drivers of sugarcane expansion and 
narratives of change in the industry including practices.  
District interviews illuminated agribusiness practices and their impacts on local and 
regional development prospects (n=15). Interviews considered district-agribusiness relationships 
and implications for regional development. Meanwhile a diverse group of participants at sub-
district level were included to generate a cross section of views on the agribusiness conduct and 
practices. These included government departments, input suppliers to the sugar industry and private 
actors (Table 1).  
 2 
  Table 1: Summary data collection  
National-level interviews  State departments/agencies, NGOs, Donors, academic 
and think-tanks etc  
n=37 
Industry related interviews  Sugar companies, processors and dealers n=10 
District-level interviews   Government departments, input suppliers, commercial 
actors and NGOs  
n=15 
Sub-district data collection with diverse participants 
 
Kaleya Magobbo Manyonyo 
Key informant interviews  8 8 1 
In-depth household interviews  6 6  –  
Focus group discussions 5 5 1 
                                     Non-sugarcane/Contract participants (Magobbo)  
Focus group discussion   –  1  –  
Wider community interviews  3 3 3 
 
 
Household interviews were conducted across better-off, medium, and poor categories, taking an 
oral history style and linked to smallholder experiences.  Focus group discussions were also 
conducted across gender, age, and farmer associations, concentrating on agribusiness adaptation, 
practices, capabilities, scheme governance and implications for industry participation.  
Analysis considered broad themes developed from qualitative data manually and using 
software NVivo. These were then subjected to thematic analysis and linked to research objectives 
(Kumar 2005; Bazeley 2007). An open coding scheme was adopted in the analysis of policy 
documents. Coded fragments of the documents were then linked to the themes in the research 
objectives. Concepts from the policy documents were labelled and defined into specific categories 
and dimensions for comparisons with agribusiness power domains. Policy analysis with an 
inductive approach enabled us to link policy elements to practice, which was important i  exploring 
agribusiness influence (Cole 1988).     
4. Analysis 
Intra-domain analyses show how an agribusiness combines different forms of power to shape 
policy, regional and local dynamics. Analysis of interview data shows power with dominates an 
agribusiness power expression across all levels followed by power to. As discussed in the following 
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sections, this was reflective of state-donor collaborations as well as corporate financial and 
economic power.       
4.1 Regional and local-level analyses: agribusinesses, rural and economic development 
Objective 1 focuses on regional and local domains within which agribusiness power and influence 
is perceived. These were selected based on their ability to show power to, power with, power over, 
and power within as summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2: Domains and power dynamics (shaded boxes show emphasised power; blank boxes shows 
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To demonstrate agribusiness power over, power to, and power with, regional and local analyses 
identified practices of an agribusiness in three domains: 1) wider development linkages, 2) land 
tenure relations, and 3) labour dynamics. We focus on these in the following sections.  
a. Agribusinesses in Wider Development Linkages 
Agribusinesses have been promoted for regional and local development in Zambia. A senior 
political representative believes ‘Mazabuka is privileged to host the biggest agribusiness in the 
region’ (D5:26.06.15), which has been accompanied by business opportunities in banking, 
construction, hospitality and fast-foods industries. Related investments in social and economic 
infrastructure such as energy, irrigation, health and education arguably ‘enhance the socio-
economic status of the district’ and contributed to poverty reduction (D6:26.06.2015). However, 
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most public officers were critical, arguing ZaSPlc changed the patterns of development in the 
district/region.  
Interviews revealed a lack of cooperation and engagement between ZaSPlc and the district 
such as in development planning, infrastructure and social-service delivery. One example was the 
Spatial Development Framework for the Mazabuka Urban Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 
which, driven by the theme Building Mazabuka Together, was designed to guide present and future 
developments in the district. One officer in the Planning Department reported ZaSPlc was ‘a key 
stakeholder in the development of the IDP but became disinterested during implementation’ 
(D12:16.01.16). Instead, the company was perceived to exert power to by generating its own 
development plans mostly within the estate, which to our respondent in the Planning Department, 
‘were incompatible with district sustainable development plans’ (D12:16.01.16). Planning Officers 
accused ZaSPlc of ‘illegality in land development and planning within estates’ (D8:16.01.16) but 
blamed this on the agribusiness’ power with in national political and economic connections which 
was perceived as limiting and undermining local regulations.   
District interviews showed sugarcane expansion changed demographic dynamics of 
Mazabuka. The largest migrant group in the formal agricultural sector in Zambia are cane cutters 
from North-Western, Western and Southern provinces to Mazabuka (SDMa:12.06.16). This 
transitory workforce predominantly male was cited by the Planning Department asstraining public 
infrastructure, housing and health services. The argument was that, ‘se sonal workers stopped 
returning to their villages,’ and ‘are acquiring and developing illegal pieces of land’ which 
contributed to unplanned settlements (D12.16.01.16). A consistent theme across district 
interviewees was that social service and infrastructure provisioning was less prominent in ZaSPlc’s 
social activities. For instance, power to and power with enabled ZaSPlc to restrict education, 
housing, and health services to their estates and direct employees despite calls to extend services 
to wider areas (ActionAid 2011).  
District officials expressed opinions the presence of an agribusiness undermined revenue 
generation in the local authority (power over). Municipal Council officers bemoaned lack of 
valuable service contracts such as those around warehousing, distribution and haulage as conduits 
for securing economic benefits but instead perceived a ‘strong foreign business involvement’ 
(D7:12.15). For instance, most warehousing and distribution on the one hand, and cane haulage on 
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the other are reportedly conducted by Barlow World Logistics and Rolling Thunder respectively 
(Richardson 2010). Thus, many district officers believed ZaSPlc gave a false reputation about the 
district: ‘that we receive a lot of money from the corporation’ (D8:26.06.2015). 
Others believed it was almost impossible for the local authority to explore revenue 
generating streams linked to the agribusiness because of continuous state intervention i local 
decisions such as around taxation. Respondents reported how state officials enter investment sites 
to make policy pronouncements and express their support for ZaSPlc. Respondents constantly 
referred to government decision to abolish crop-levy (2009), which cost the local authority an 
estimated $400,000 annual cane levy from ZaSPlc (see Richardson 2010, p.929). According to the 
area Member of Parliament, this has led to serious ‘erosion of financial capacity in the local 
authority’ (D2:11.06.16). The decision to scrap crop-levy is generally perceived to illustrate 
ZaSPlc’s influence in national politics (power with), but also highlights governance gaps at local 
level. That the directive to scrap crop levy came when the then President Rupiah Banda officiated 
at the company’s launch of Nakambala sugar estate in 2009 confirms perceived power with: 
‘I wish to assure South African investors…that their investment in Zambia is secure, 
safeguarded by the progressive politics and robust legal framework put in lace by my 
government’ (Chishimba and Mulenga 2009, cited in Richardson 2010, p.928). 
One political representative reflected that this meant that the agribusiness had many ways of 
achieving its objectives even at the expense of local capacity. Consequently, most district officers 
felt disempowered by state-business relations seen as undermining local authority not only on 
taxation but also on ability to intervene in estates/schemes such as on environmental regulation. 
One reason is what respondents referred to as the government’s ‘neoliberal light touch’ approach 
to the sector, which allows policies to oscillate between imposing taxes and removing it, and 
between strict socio-economic and environmental rules to relaxing them.  
b. Land Tenure Relations    
Land tenure relations were selected o highlight agribusiness power to and power over in local 
domains including engagement with smallholders. Revenue Authority records reveal that 93% 
(n=38) of commercial entities producing sugarcane were based in Mazabuka, connecting to 
ZaSPlc. One outcome has been conversion of vast customary land from subsistence agriculture 
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(maize, livestock) to commercial sugarcane under diverse land ownership and production 
arrangements. Consequently, ‘90% of land in Mazabuka falls under commercial farming’ 
according to one agricultural officer (D13:16.01.16) and ‘possibly titled’ (D2:11.06.16). The 
launch of the first ever Citizen Economic Empowerment Initiative in 2008 stems from a wide 
perceived failure of Zambians to benefit from foreign investments. However, despite some political 
countermovement such as in the previous regime of Levy Mwanawasa that reportedly stopped 
ZaSPlc expansion through direct land acquisitions in the district, calling for enhanced local 
participation as outgrowers (D15:23.06.15), ZaSPlc recently incorporated 10,500ha sugarcane 
fields (2007) alongside a $200 million factory expansion n 2009. International finance in 
outgrower initiatives such as the EU’s Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol countries also 
played a crucial a role in sugarcane expansion in Mazabuka, enabling agribusiness power with.  
However, that land belongs to farmers in Manyonyo, leased out in Magobbo and under a 
management company in Kaleya reflects diverse ways in which an agribusiness shapes production 
and control land. Corporate take-over of the Manyonyo scheme in 2012 for instance is symptomatic 
of the agribusiness power and influence in the district. We focus on this to demonstrate how 
financial power enables power over as well as how political connections help an agribusiness to 
consolidates land and shape production dynamics (power with). The idea of Manyonyo pr ject
started in 2000: with direct involvement of the Ministry of Agriculture’s Smallholder Irrigation 
Project Unit. With the support of the Finnish government and the African Development Bank, 
scheme designs, layouts, and construction started in 2009. Manyonyo was originally ‘open on 
choice of crops’ such as maize, bananas, horticultural crops, but excluding sugarcane as confirmed 
by donor and state actors. 
Officers in the MoA reveal that ‘ZaSPlc claimed the project fell in its expansion radius’ 
(50km east of the Nakambala mill)  and suggested ‘modification to the scheme design and layout’ 
(Z1:29.06.15). According to officials in the MoA, the government agreed to convert the scheme to
sugarcane under an off-take agreement (power with) but leveraging smallholders in production 
decision-making. Donors as well as officers in the MoA reveal that on linking the scheme to a 
commercial bank for possible financing of Manyonyo operations, ZaSPlc changed its position 
arguing that ‘the bank processes were delaying the project.’ Discussions with ZaSPlc 
representatives corroborate: ‘the bank gave uncomfortable clauses such as on disbursement of 
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funds’ and upon reviewing them, ‘we thought these clauses could chain smallholders’ 
(ZaSPlc2:06.15) (power to). Group discussion with Manyonyo scheme representatives revealed 
how ZaSPlc undercut the bank’s funding of ZMK13.5 million (595ha) and revised ZMK3.5 million 
(250ha) at 20% interest rate to offer ZMK1.5 million (126ha) at 14% loan through its brainchild 
Mazabuka Cane Growers Trust (MCGT) in 2014 (X3:27.06.15). These perspectives also play out 
among farmers in Manyonyo: ‘if not for ZaSPlc, no single cane would have been grown in this 
project’ (X3:27.06.15) (power over). We return to this positive view of ZaSPlc later but suffice to 
say that this reflects the wider power with – of public image and reputation that ZaSPlc wants to 
entrench in political and economic circles asbeing smallholder driven which was then highlighted 
by the establishment of the Smallholder Development office within the company in 2014. ZaSPlc 
prided itself that whilst the idea of Manyonyo project started in 2002, it was within 2 years of its 
involvement that the project was operationalised/implemented.  
Meanwhile ZaSPlc power to and power over through financial and market power was 
perceived across all schemes. In Kaleya, the MCGT financed 6.2% smallholder equity stake in 
KASCOL giving farmers a total of 19.5%. Again, the real value of this financing lies less in being 
pro-smallholders than in shaping decision-making at KASCOL in favour of MCGT and thus 
ZaSPlc which already held 25% stake in the intermediary. Elsewhere in Magobbo, MCGT funded 
and facilitated farmer relocations a  well as 20% initial development costs which, according to one 
representative at MCGT has conditions that ‘are incomparable to bank lending rates’ 
(ZaSPlc3:06.15. There was a perception among district actors that these sorts of support acted o 
extend ZaSPlc’s power and influence. For instance, this way ZaSPlc was perceived to d flect wider 
‘land grabbing’ narratives despite exerting central management of production that are characteristic 
of plantations that ensures corporate land consolidation (Power within).  
This relates to Illovo and the public face of smallholder sugar sourcing in southern Africa. 
For instance, Oxfam’s ‘Behind the Brands Campaign’ witnessed commitments from global 
corporations such as PepsiCo and Coca-cola to ‘zero tolerance’ for land grabs in their sugar 
sourcing (Oxfam 2013). Suppliers such as Illovo Sugar have made similar commitments with 
respects to smallholders and land rights. Illovo published its own guidelines on land and land rights 
with reference to sustainable farming practices and land acquisition within its supply chain. ‘Illovo 
prioritises alternative model investments, such as the development of smallholder grower farming 
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operations in areas in which we operate, rather than acquiring their land for our own development’ 
it says (Illovo 2016). Illovo is now considered a ‘champion’ on ‘just sugar sourcing’ (Oxfam 2016). 
In response to land-grabbing concerns such as from advocacy groups, a quote from the ZaSPlc 
representative is illustrative of power within: ‘here we don’t have land-grabs. We actually look for 
land to benefit local people’ (ZaSPlc2:16.06.15). Whilst there is no technical ‘land-grabs’ in 
Mazabuka, Illovo manages to control vast swathes of land, and through employing different 
management systems limit  the uptake and participation, choice and opportunities for farmers 
(power over). 
c. Labour Dynamics  
Labour dynamics enabled analyses of agribusiness power to and power within in local level labour 
regimes. We show how an agribusiness exerts power to through economic power and power within 
using its image and reputation aslarger employer to shape as well as undermine labour regimes. A 
widely held public image about ZaSPlc in Zambia is that the number of people employed by ZaSPlc 
provided not only a good example of how an agribusiness should interface with local economies 
but also represented the biggest contribution to the national economy. Frequently quoted figures 
show that the sugar industry engages over 11,000 people directly and 75,000 indirectly, most of 
which are associated with ZaSPlc (Palerm et al. 2010, p.1) (Figure 3). The importance of job 
creation cannot be undermined politically, as the government is clear: ‘we don’t want to shake 
these companies providing employment’ (Z1:09.12.15). Some NGOs believe that this narrative 
raised challenges for agribusinesses regulation whilst others expressed opinions that policy 
positions on rural employment and the need to garner political support from an opposition 
dominated southern region offers opportunities for ZaSPlc to exert influence (G3:14.06.15). 
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Figure 3: Fixed-term and seasonal employment trends i  Nanga Farms 
Tight control over production systems permits ZaSPlc to influence diverse labour regimes in 
sugarcane. Financial and economic dominance i  production enables ZaSPlc to deploy skilled 
expatriate staff whilst exploiting unskilled labour and limiting smallholder uptake in schemes 
(power to), as corroborated by Richardson (2010). This dualism means that despite the much 
publicised job creation, labour intensity n sugarcane is low. One donor representative at the ADB 
illustrated that ‘$16 million spent on 165 farmers in Manyonyo could informally engage around 
200,000 farmers in the cotton sector’ (K2:18.06.15). However, according to one independent 
consultant, ZaSPlc has always argued that ‘what they don’t meet through direct formal engagement 
of smallholders is off-set through massive recruitment of workers’ (P2:15.06.15). At issue, 
however, is that many of these sugarcane related jobs are seasonal (Figure 3), depressing gross 
disbursement of wages more so in outgrower systems where we found wages were reduced by a 
factor of three, when compared to ZaSPlc’s own plantations. 
4.2 National level analysis: policy practices and business influence  
Objective 2 focuses on key national-level policies shaping the sugar industry, and how these 
processes have been framed to eepen an agribusiness power and influence. Analysis isolates five 
domains where policies and practices in sugarcane expansion play out to enhance different sorts of 
agribusiness power. 
182 169 172




































First is ZaSPlc perceived policy influence around vitamin A fortification of sugar (VitAF). 
Existing nutrition studies show that Zambia has multiple micro-nutrient deficiencies, including 
vitamin A (Zhang et al. 2016). Frequently quoted figures cite Vitamin A deficiencies 
(xerophthalmia) of over 65% and 53% among children and women respectively as driver to Vit.AF 
(Z13:23.18.16). In response, all  domestic or imported sugar for direct consumption in Zambia 
require mandatory fortification with vitamin A. Interestingly, Vit.AF has been coordinated by the 
Food and Nutrition Commission (NFNC) under the Ministry of Health. Despite low sugar access 
among majority Zambians, Vit.AF continues to shape sugar politics in Zambia.  
The NFNC confirmed that the capacity and capabilities of ZaSPlc in the industry (power 
to) gave the agribusiness an advantage over alternative vehicles such as maize meal. A senior 
officer at the NFNC explained how using a production capacity of over 250,000 MT (1998), 
‘ZaSPlc convinced stakeholders of its capabilities to satisfy the domestic market and in order to 
receive state/donor support’ (Z13:18.12.15). In immediately establishing itself in the Vit.AF and 
public health policy developments, collaborations with international finance such as UNICEF and 
the Global Alliance enabled ZaSPlc power with in subsidizing/facilitating fortification, equipment 
and other concessions.  
A widely held view among respondents was that Vi t.AF is effectively a non-tariff barrier 
on sugar imports which limits entry of new investors (power with). To some actors in the food and 
beverage industry (FaBI), power with effectively ‘ ocks the market for Illovo’ (P4:15.12.15). 
According to one Consultant, that ZaSPlc contributes ‘only 10% of total production of Illovo 
against 30-40% net profit of the group’ (P1:05.01.16) (Illovo 2016) is illustrative of how donor-
state collaborations around Vit.AF enable ZaSPlc to exploit the domestic market. Sugarcane 
companies and private consultants revealed how prospective investments in different parts of the 
country failed to take-off for various reasons. However, interviewees implied that a deliberate 
failure by government o enhance competition, and intra-sector diversity through a financial focus 
on outgrowers linked to ZaSPlc was to blame, which again reflected agribusiness power with. 
Limited investments in the sector have thus been blamed on ZaSPlc’s power with seen as 
discouraging new investments. 
The links between Vit.AF and sugar import regulations imposed by various state 
departments and supported by ZaSPlc which calls for strict application of Vit.AF rules (power 
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with) are strong. For instance, flexing its industry presence within the politics of VitAF, an NGO 
representative explained how ZaSPlc called for ‘rigorous scrutiny of emerging sugar processors,’ 
accusing them of failing to comply with packaging, labelling, quality and testing guidelines (power 
over) (Q4:09.12.15). Through such influence, ZaSPlc was perceived to coerce the government to
renege on possible industry reforms. For a long period of time FaBI and NGO actors have called 
for abolishing Vit.AF alongside recommendations to allow sugar imports. They have also called 
for deliberate policy to encourage more agribusiness in the industry as well as limit  state 
involvement in the industry for competition and market growth (Ellis et al. 2010). However, state 
agencies insist on import permits from the MoA and elsewhere, entrenching ZaSPlc’s industry 
position and limiting industry competition (GRZ 2017). Whereas inability to allow imports was 
seen by many as protecting the local market, state failure to promote competitiveness in the sector 
is pointed to ZaSPlc’s power with (Richardson 2010). Some policy actors in the MoA corroborate: 
‘agribusinesses lack transparency and wield too much power’ (Z1:29.06.15). Meanwhile, the FaBI 
actors as well as processors argue that whilst the public health objectives of Vit.AF are noble, 
related processes have hindered market growth and industry competition. Think-tanks, FaBI and 
NGO actors expressed concerns that the recently revised Food and Drugs Act (1994) which 
maintains fortification shows that ‘reforms in favour of VitAF will continue to shape the dynamics 
of sugar’ (G2:18.12.15) and so will the presence of ZaSPlc.  
Second is the donor-driven formulation of the Zambia National Sugar Adaptation Strategy 
(ZNSS). The ZNSS responds to trade policy shifts in the EU that departs from fixed regulations 
and price management i  sugar markets to building partnerships and private sector development, 
considered the primary means for governing traditional export sectors in developing countries 
(Orbie 2007). In this transition, the European Commission offered financial assistance to 
developing countries for trade capacity (CEC 2012). Known as the Accompanying Measures for 
Sugar Protocols Countries (AMSP), objectives of this ‘aid for trade initiative’ point to enhancing 
sugar industry competitiveness, diversifying the economies of cane growing areas and addressing 
wider impacts of the reforms in adjusting countries (Richardson and Richardson-Ngwenya 2014).  
The ZNSS is one major specific measure for promoting sugarcane. Formulated in 2006, the 
ZNSS prioritised sugar expansion through: 1) outgrower schemes; 2) sugar diversification; 3) 
infrastructure; and 4) the development of a national sugar trade policy (Palerm et al. 2010). As with 
Vit.AF, the implementation of the ZNSS revolved around ZaSPlc, with state-donor actors lauding 
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the resulting integration of smallholders, bioethanol production and infrastructure development. 
That smallholder integration points o Magobbo and/or Manayonyo schemes means the ZNSS 
inserted ZaSPlc directly into state-donor programs (power with). Again, using scale, capacity nd 
financial capabilities, ZaSPlc positioned itself to play a crucial role in actualising state-donor policy 
developments including guaranteeing their funds i  the development of outgrower schemes which 
further plays to its image and reputation (Power to) (Palerm et al. 2010). Consequently, ZaSPlc 
effectively brought additional 1000ha under direct production and control within two years. 
Analysis shows that a macro focus in the ZNSS neglected environmental issues. That donors and 
the government belatedly conducted a Strategic Environmental Assessment for sugarcane 
expansion – 4 years after the ZNSS – confirms these concerns (Palerm et al. 2010). Crucially, 
whilst the ZNSS expands scope for production in Mazabuka and around ZaSPlc, the SEA warns 
about serious water availability challenges stemming from competing uses: power generation, 
agriculture, mining and urban consumption in the main ‘sugarbelt’ Kafue River. A neglect in 
environmental regulation by the local authority highlight ZaSPlc power over in regional/local 
authority.  
Third is a widely held perception that ZaSPlc deploys power to and power with through 
financial and economic opportunities to exploit the domestic market through access to concessions, 
including influence on trade policy rules that govern sugar imports. Prior to ts historic factory 
expansion investment, ZaSPlc signed an IPPA, which interviewees believed effectively granted the 
agribusiness three advantages. First, was guaranteeing its investments in Zambia. Second was 
depressing its import bill such as on machinery whilst helping access cheap finance. Third and 
most importantly was compelling the government to treat sugar as a ‘sensitive and priority product 
within policy guidelines’ (Mataka 2008 cited in Richardson 2010, p.929). With effective state bias 
towards foreign businesses and that only multi-million-dollar projects qualify for IPPAs, ZaSPlc’s 
economic power is perceived to play a crucial role in accessing concessions and shaping industry 
dynamics as corroborated by Richardson (2010). 
Fourth is ZaSPlc’s perceived power over in sugar price transmission and dynamics. Zambia 
is a low-cost sugar producing country, averaging US$169/tonne compared to US$263/tonne world 
average (Ellis et al. 2010). In highlighting pricing politics, the CPCC fined ZaSPlc 5% 
(ZMK76,728,650) of 2013 annual turnover for ‘price discrimination and unfair pricing’ (GRZ 
2017). The CPCC reports that one category of industrial consumers was charged 22% more than 
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others and that household consumers paid 28% more than the former also paying 41% higher 
compared to regional/export consumers. To one NGO representative, ‘this fine is long 
overdue…and hoped ‘this will unlock the market to encourage competition’ (Q6:25.10.17). 
However, other NGO representatives were sceptical that concrete demands for ZaSPlc to 
immediately effect new price structure are missing, adding: ‘there are lessons to be learnt on how 
agribusinesses commit injustices with impunity’ (Q7:26.10.2017). FaBI actors who command 24% 
of the overall 41% of ZaSPlc’s overall domestic sales gave examples of how the firm increased 
sugar prices five times (oscillating between 7% and 14%) in 2014, whilst 2015 saw increases of 
12.5% and 17%, sparking negative reaction among industrial consumers. In re ponse, industrial 
consumers complained to the Competition Commission (CPCC) calling for reduction in prices to 
world market levels alongside a 10% surcharge to cover local conditions or allow sugar imports 
(Chisanga et al. 2014). However, interviewees argued that rather than addressing concerns through 
a wider stakeholder consultation and representation from FaBI, ‘the MoA and ZaSPlc met and later 
sent adjusted prices’ (power with) (P5:15.12.15). A general perception was that this highlighted 
not only the way decisions were being made in the industry and how ZaSPlc shaped competition 
(power to) but also how absence of government action on market issues entrenched agribusiness 
influence in national politics (power with). 
 The final domain reflects the way labour issues play-out at national policy level to highlight 
power within. National policies have allowed reduced minimum wages for the agricultural and 
sugar industry in Zambia. National interviews reveald how inadequate regulation and rules that 
permit ZaSPlc and strong lobby groups to negotiate and influence discounted sector minimum 
wages contribute to poor labour conditions at local level. A senior economist at the largest national 
farmers union (ZNFU) explained that the combination of seasonal, long and short-term labour 
engagements make agriculture unique, and that the sensitivity of the sector means ‘we cannot put 
anyone on a minimum wage’ (N1:04.12.15). That the Ministry of Labour ‘has allowed this 
arrangement to continue’ means that ‘for now we are not affected by the labour legislation’ he 
added. Sector-based approach to wages and conditions of services for farm workers have been 
adopted such as such as with the National Union for Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers 
(NUPAAW) as corroborated by an officer at Nanga Farms (SDM2:20.01.16). Given the dominance 
of ZaSPlc, many respondents perceive the influence of ZaSPlc in sugarcane-specific wages and 
conditions of service (power with). Not only that, power within projected through the powerful 
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image and reputation as the largest employer that puts ZaSPlc in good terms with national politics 
further enables it to exert influence on sector labour dynamics. While discounted sector-specific 
wages suggest a neglect of labour legislation, it also reflects the economic power wielded by the 
agribusiness as well as limits of state power in state-business relationships. 
Within the labour perspective, there have been concerns that state institutions face 
challenges of how to enforce tax and labour laws. District officials reported ‘casualisation’ of 
labour and poor health and safety standards in sugarcane, which they blamed on weak frameworks 
for monitoring agricultural conditions on plantations/estates. Some of these relate to inability of 
local actors to enter production sites to assess adherence to agriculture and sustainability guidelines. 
According to one agricultural officer, ‘[t]here is politics involved in sugarcane. As civil servants, 
we have stepped-back lest we get accused of supporting an [opposition]  political p rty’ 
highlighting power over (D13:16.01.16). Analyses reveal that this way agro-investments 
contributed to the informality of the sector and continued absence of social security. There have 
been complaints about alienation of local authorities n the business of sugarcane and general lack 
of embeddedness in the regional economy that potentially produces regulatory blind spots (power 
over).  
4.3 Actors, structure and organisation of the sugar industry    
The final objective explores key actors, and their influence i  the sugar sub-sector. Our evaluation 
of the sugar industry started by identifying key actors/institutions shaping national and industry 
policies and practices. These were then linked to the perceived number of individuals (Figure 4). 
Whilst various institutions interplay to influence the sugar industry, analysis shows it is state-
donor-agribusiness relations that dominate, enabling expression of agribusiness power in national, 
regional and local domains.   
 
 
Figure 4: Actor influence in the sugar industry. Diameter of bubbles signify estimated number of actors/individuals involved in relation 
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State institutions exert power to formulate national and industry policies, whilst promoting 
outgrower schemes. Nutrition bodies such as the NFNC shape agribusiness/industry practices 
through controversial public health policies such as those on fortification (Vit.AF). The 
Competition Commission (CPCC) regulate and shape market guidelines, accepting agribusinesses 
as private-sector development. Other institutions facilitate land acquisitions (Ministry of Lands, 
MoL), promote agro-investments (Zambia Development Agency, ZDA), and regulate water-righ s 
whilst fostering renewable energy (Ministry of Energy and Water Development, MoEWD). The 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) promotes commercial farming, whilst others facilitate trade and 
sugar related policies (Ministry of Commerce and Trade, MoCTI). Social and environmental 
sustainability aligns to the environmental management agency (ZEMA) which approves sugarcane 
projects but suffer political influence (Giles 2017). 
Multilateral and bilateral development institutions provide technical and financial support. 
However, through resources and infrastructure, donors hold power t  shape policy as well as power 
with state institutions and agribusinesses to expand sugarcane production (Manda et al. 2018). 
State-donor induced irrigation infrastructure enables smallholder integration through outgrower 
schemes whilst entrenching agribusiness concentration (Manda et al. 2018).   
Associations such as the National Farmers Union (ZNFU) influence sector labour politics 
and policies such as on electricity tariffs and trade, production and market dynamics but their 
influence remains mixed. Local authorities intervene i  land issues, with chiefs acting as key 
facilitators but are limited by state or agribusiness actors. Local and international NGOs that focus 
on welfare (CSPR), livelihoods (Oxfam), land rights (ZLA) as well as tax justice (ActionAid) also 
exert little industry influence, with efforts being more sectoral and less vigorously pursued (Phiri 
et al. 2015; ActionAid 2011). Similarly, household consumers a e unable to engage the 
government/corporations such as on product quality and potential ‘discriminatory and unfair 
pricing’ (GRZ 2017). Industrial consumers in the FaBI exhibit power within to organise and 
influence sector dynamics such as prices, but identify lack of competition as inhibiting their 
business potential (GRZ 2017).  
Overall data suggests that expanding state, donor and agribusiness influence limit  spaces 
for broad-based stakeholder participation n the industry such as those in FaBI and advocacy 
groups. One FaBI actor expressed an opinion that ‘the biggest problem is that ZaSPlc has no 
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competitor at a large-scale,’ enabling it to ‘establish a dictatorship line of doing business’ 
(P6:15.12.15). This was largely blamed on industry lack of competition, particularly ‘government’s 
disinterest in inviting other players to enter the market’ and through ‘granting significant 
incentives to ZaSPlc’ (Q4:09.12.15). According to a Fellow at the Research-Tank IAPRI, the 
government has allowed ‘different authorities in the sugar industry’ which at times ‘seems to 
contradict its own policy on investment promotion and private-sector participation’ (G3:14.06.15). 
However, donor and state collaborations enable and sustain ZaSPlc’s expressions of power and 
influence in industry practices. State institutions were particularly accused of entrenching 
agribusiness interests. For instance, to our respondent at the Competition Commission, lack of 
wider industry participation at large-scale level was probably because ‘th market is not conducive 
enough for other players to enter’ (Z10:18.12.15Z) enabling an agribusiness power and influence 
across multiple levels and domains as highlighted in previous sections. 
5. Discussion  
This paper highlights perceptions of how an agribusiness uses it  power to shape sustainability in 
policy and industry practices. Through a combination of different sorts of power interplay, an 
agribusiness exerts control over the governance dynamics of an agro-industry chain, whilst limiting 
its commitment to social and economic sustainability. While various actors shape national and 
industry dynamics of sugarcane, state-donors-agribusiness relations dominate, ensuring 
agribusiness role in national development and agriculture. One outcome is that possibilities of 
sustainable agriculture, rural and economic development have been undermined by actual 
agribusiness practices a exemplified in local-level domains. By identifying different domains, we 
highlight the limits and importance of domestic institutions in framing LaSAIs as well as mediating 
corporate practices that will be required to enable a greater focus on sustainable agriculture and 
rural development.    
The push for LaSAIs in Africa remains central in international policy on development and 
agriculture, ensuring agribusiness expansion. Donor and state actors shape mechanisms that 
underpin transformations in agriculture, but also raise governance issues (German et l. 2016). 
Gaventa’s power framework enables analyses of agribusiness power between and within various 
levels and domains. Agribusinesses deploy their ‘power of presence’ to influence policy 
management around sugarcane expansion, acting as key facilitators of government/donor projects 
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through their willingness to incorporate smallholders (Richardson and Richardson-Ngwenya 
2014). However, this power with is problematic for genuine stakeholder participation and 
agriculture sustainability, as highlighted in national and sub-national domains. For instance, control 
in land tenure relations as well as labour regimes means resource-bearing communities remain 
peripheral in key production decisions, affecting local economic benefits.   
Agribusinesses influence policy management, and outgrower arrangements, challenging 
mainstream inclusionary narratives (Manda et al. 2018). Dominance in production accompanied 
by tight control over land and water aswell as market channels highlight regional and local level 
power. While exploiting the publicly articulated focus on smallholders, in practice, agribusinesses 
limit  wider uptake of growers as can be seen in its continued dominance in primary agriculture in 
local domains (Richardson 2010). Even where these have been integrated, different production 
systems split smallholders, affecting local cooperation. This increasingly facilitates physical and 
economic exclusion of smallholders both from agriculture and land whilst deepening ecological 
and social contradictions of industrial agriculture (Manda et l. 2018; Spann 2017). Sustainable 
local development must thus be viewed in the context of how policy developments and practices 
induce land concentration among powerful agribusinesses and how governance is shaped (Elgert 
2016).  
Policies and priorities for commercial agriculture produce an opposite effect, privileging an 
agribusiness at the expense of smallholder systems of agriculture as highlighted in national 
domains. For instance, the push for Vit.AF around an agribusiness reflect corporate power, 
enabling power of presence (Clapp and Scrinis 2017), whilst national policies adversely constrain 
local policies and practices, such as regulation and governance of outgrower schemes. While donor 
and state infrastructure create opportunities for smallholder integration, this support is r blematic 
for agribusiness concentration and commitment to agriculture for development (Spann 2017). 
Agribusiness and sugar promotion i  national policies conceal silent realities of industrial 
agriculture as high user of water, agro-chemicals and land, which undermines sustainability claims 
(Leguizamon 2016). However, weak interaction between and among high-level national 
institutions and those at the local government level, highlight governance challenges in the latter, 
for example accountability, power, responsibilities, decision-making.  
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Global debates around ‘just sugar sourcing’ or ‘sustainable commodities’ increasingly 
deflect attention from agribusiness practices in countries that view LaSAIs as magic bullet for local 
development (Elgert 2016). In our case, regulation and monitoring failures from local authorities 
presents opportunities for unsustainable agribusiness practices (Giles 2017). A key governance 
challenge is the mandate of regional and local authorities to engage with agribusinesses. The way 
agribusinesses operate, oscillating between national and local level domains of power means that 
local authorities are merely spectators of developments in he sugar sub-sector, almost completely 
excluded from policy and institutional formulation, implementation and monitoring. Our case 
shows how the power framework illuminate scalar/governance mismatches, and the need for 
institutional arrangements to account for multi-level and multi-actor interactions which shape 
outcomes. Drawing from mono-governance perspectives, the role of the local authority is thus
unclear (Van Alstine 2014).  
There are clear mismatches between realities at local level and what national actors believe is 
the way to manage agribusinesses and LaSAIs. But this lacks salience, credibility, and legitimacy 
in the eyes of critical players at regional and local level (Cash et al. 2003). Powerful corporations 
in agriculture present difficulties for poor countries like Zambia to leverage socio-economic and 
environmental benefits. Some of this relate to lack of agribusiness social and economic 
embeddedness in the local economy, as discussed in regional/local domains. Although state 
officials can be excited by the presence of an agribusiness at local level, their ability to regulate 
corporations is limited by an overlap in authority between national and local actors. District 
officials especially civils servants spoke of the difficult in monitoring and regulating agribusiness 
activities, compounded by national-level political involvement. There is little evidence that the 
local authority was acknowledged as a monitoring and regulatory structure by ZaSPlc. More 
widely, sugarcane issues, information sharing, and decision-making processes are highly 
centralized, with the district level of governance often bypassed. As elsewhere (Van Alstine t al. 
2006), a lack of local government involvement and increased government control means that 
authority is being implicitly (or even explicitly) transferred to foreign agribusinesses operating  
the sector, raising social and ecological contradictions. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper highlights domains and how an agribusiness uses its ‘power of presence’ within the 
jurisdictional scale to shape sustainability in policy and industry practices in Zambia. The paper 
has assessed how different actors interact to shape domains underpinning agribusiness expression 
of power. One key governance gap identified from analyses of multi-level interactions and multi-
level actors is weak regional and local government capacity. Governance gaps and limited capacity 
to monitor, regulate and influence anagribusiness were identified in three domains: agribusinesses 
embeddedness (or lack of it) in wider development processes; land tenure relations; and labour 
regimes and practices. Regional and local-level practices reflect mono-centric governance 
perspectives which exerts state power and authority over the regional and local economies as well 
as industry policy. This feature not only enables an agribusiness to oscillate between national, 
regional, and local levels but also permits enormous influence within the national scales, as 
exemplified in five domains: public health policy on Vit.AF; the donor-driven Zambia National 
Sugar Adaptation Strategy; access to investor concessions; sugar price formation and transmission; 
and national labour policy regimes. Through a combination of different sorts of power interplay, 
an agribusiness exerts control over the governance dynamics of an agro-industry chain, whilst 
limiting its social and economic contributions including uptake of growers. By identifying different 
domains around the sugar industry, we highlight the limits and importance of domestic institutions 
in framing large-scale agricultural investments as well as mediating corporate practices that will 
be required to provide a greater focus on sustainable agriculture and rural development. 
Analysis provides insights into the centrality of relationships between and among 
agribusinesses and development actors in determining realities and prospects for sustainable 
development including industry-specific practices within which smallholders are implicated. 
Findings of this study enables us to reflect on the limits of what national and local institutions can 
achieve with regards sustainability and sets us to think about how we can enable a greater focus on 
sustainability at different governance scales and levels. Sugar related issues have been framed at 
national level through policy practices, but weak interactions with local-level authorities produce 
crucial mismatches. Agribusiness expansion as pathway for delivering sustainable development is 
consequently problematic for agriculture, local development as well as sustainability. Top-down 
nature of sugarcane promotion and expansion, control over land and water resources raises 
problematic socio-economic and economic contradictions associated with LaSAIs.  
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Our use of the concept ‘power of presence’ is novel in that it helps unpack levels and domains 
throughout an agro-industry chain within which agribusiness power unfolds. In odoing, the paper 
helps to extend the existing literature on power dimensions of LaSAIs and agribusinesses, by 
bringing national processes that shape investment outcomes and raising questions for future 
research. Our discussion of agribusiness power of presence shows contested agro-industry chain 
characterised by different sorts of power across all levels, enabling agribusiness control and 
influence. Our analysis suggests that despite claims that LaSAIs can be inclusive and account for 
local realities (World Bank 2011), regional and local participation is lacking. It shows that analyses 
that examine power dynamics within policy and industry practices enables us to reflect on the limits 
of what national and local institutions can achieve with regards sustainability. Most importantly, 
the study highlights the need to examine the industry structure under which diverse actors operate 
and the power dynamics that shape actions and determine outcomes. This paper has identified how 
the much-promulgated agriculture for development discourse and focus on agribusiness actors 
entrenches power of presence whilst concealing ecological and social contradictions related to 
LaSAIs. These findings are context specific but raise promising questions for further research. The 
fragmented governance of agribusinesses and LaSAIs in general challenges simplistic claims 
around the role of agriculture in international and regional policy management.   
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